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P
romoting homeownership has long been a policy 
priority in the United States. Because homeowner-
ship is thought to benefit not only individuals and 
families, but also communities and the nation as a 
whole, a number of federal, state, and local initiatives have 
been directed toward helping households achieve homeown-
ership. Much progress has been made, and the past decade 
has seen a significant increase in homeownership rates. (See 
Figure 1.1) While national rates have started to come down 
slightly from a high of nearly 70 percent in 2004, the Joint 
Center for Housing Studies notes that among certain groups 
and in certain areas, homeownership rates have continued 
to climb even over the past year.
Most notably, minority and low-income households have 
achieved significant gains in homeownership. While gaps in 
homeownership between whites and minorities persist, mi-
norities made up nearly 50 percent of the 12.5 million rise in 
the number of homeowners over the past decade.1 Mortgage 
lending statistics from the early years of the recent housing 
boom are more telling about these gains; from 1993 to 1999, 
home purchase lending to white borrowers grew by just 42 
percent, while lending to African-American borrowers in-
creased by 98 percent and lending to Hispanic borrowers 
increased by 125 percent. The gains for lower-income house-
holds are equally notable; while the number of mortgage 
loans to high-income borrowers (those earning more than 
120 percent of Area Median Income, or AMI) grew by 52 
percent between 1993 and 1999, loans made to home buyers 
earning less than 80 percent of AMI grew by 94 percent.2 
A number of factors have contributed to these gains, 
including economic growth, record low mortgage interest 
rates, and regulatory changes. Innovations within the mort-
gage industry have played a key role as well. Automated 
underwriting, risk-based pricing, and the expansion of the 
secondary mortgage market have increased access to and 
availability of credit, and have likely propelled recent gains 
in homeownership rates across the board.3 
Product innovation
Housing  advocates,  lenders,  and  regulators  also  point 
to mortgage product innovation for its role in boosting the 
availability of credit. While the U.S. mortgage market was 
dominated for decades by the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage,   
it now includes an array of products broadly referred to as 
nontraditional  or  alternative  mortgage  products  (AMPs). 
Many of these products are variations of adjustable rate mort-
gages (ARMs) which trade off long-term stability in monthly 
housing costs for lowered initial monthly payments. Inter-
est-only mortgages, for example, allow borrowers to defer 
repayment of the loan principle for a portion of the loan 
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Figure 1.1
Homeownership Rate 
in the United States, 
1986 – 2006 (Q3)
Source: U.S. Census.Box 1.1 12th District Trends in Mortgage Lending
A number of analyses have indicated that states in the Federal Reserve’s 12th District have seen particularly high uptake 
of nontraditional mortgage products. California, for instance, was reported to have the highest incidence in the nation in the 
percentage of total new and refinanced mortgages that have payment options.1 Subprime mortgage originations that have 
payment options or are interest-only are especially common on the West Coast; an analysis by the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) indicated that these types of products composed over half of the non-prime mortgages originated 
in California, Nevada, Washington and Arizona as of the 4th quarter of 2005.2 Overall, the FDIC’s analysis indicates that 
in states where home prices have surged in recent years, like those in the 12th District, a greater share of home buyers 
has opted for nontraditional mortgages to afford homes otherwise priced out of reach. Additionally, the FDIC notes that 
“despite favorable delinquency and default trends thus far, analysts fear that the current rising interest rate environment, 
combined with cooling home price appreciation, will limit borrowers’ options when they face large monthly payment in-
creases. Homeowners who have not built up sufficient equity to either cover the cost of refinancing or pay down additional 
debt could face delinquency, particularly in the subprime market.”3 Given the trends in the 12th District, these concerns 
merit further attention. 
4   December 2006term before resetting to a fully amortizing payment sched-
ule. Payment-option mortgages allow borrowers to structure 
their repayment schedule such that they can make minimum 
monthly payments that do not cover either the principle or 
interest, but rather add an unpaid portion to the balance of 
the mortgage. Lenders are also increasingly originating “pig-
gyback” mortgages, which are second mortgages that reduce 
or replace down-payments, and low- and no-documentation 
loans, which require little or no verification of income.
The volume of AMP originations has tripled in recent 
years, growing from less than 10 percent of residential mort-
gages in 2003 to about 30 percent in 2005, according to a 
study released in September 2006 by the Government Ac-
countability Office (GAO).4 The GAO notes that these prod-
ucts were once offered primarily to wealthier borrowers or 
borrowers with irregular earnings as financial management 
tools, but have in recent years been more broadly marketed 
as “affordability tools” to less wealthy and less creditworthy 
borrowers in higher-priced real estate markets. (See Box 1.1: 
12th District Trends in Mortgage Lending) These products 
allow borrowers to qualify for homes that they otherwise 
would not have been able to afford using more traditional 
mortgage products.
Subprime market expansion
Another significant change has been the expansion of the 
subprime mortgage market. The subprime market provides 
credit to prospective borrowers who present more risk—for 
example, due to impaired credit histories—than those served 
by the prime market. (See Box 1.2: Predatory Lending) Lend-
ers charge subprime borrowers a “risk premium” in the form 
of higher interest rates and additional fees. 
Subprime lenders’ share of the mortgage market remains 
relatively small, but it has been growing rapidly. In 1994, 
subprime loans accounted for less than 5 percent of all mort-
gage originations; by 2005, subprime loans accounted for 
20 percent of loan originations.5 In terms of loan volume, 
subprime loan originations grew from $35 billion in 1994 
to $625 billion in 2005.6 These increases have far outpaced 
growth in the originations and dollar value of loans made 
by prime lenders.7 
Mortgage product innovation and the growth in sub-
prime lending are linked. Over the past several years there 
has  been  significant  growth  in  the  share  of  nonprime8 
originations  that  are  interest-only  or  have  payment  op-
tions. The FDIC reported that in 2002, interest-only and 
pay-option ARMs represented only 3 percent of total securi-
tized nonprime mortgage originations. However, during the 
past two years the interest-only share of credit to nonprime 
borrowers has risen to 30 percent of securitized nonprime 
mortgages, and the share of payment option products has 
similarly increased. (See Figure 1.2) 
Are these gains sustainable?
Many homebuyers have benefited from expanded access 
to alternative mortgage products and growth in the subprime 
market. The downside to these trends is that some of these 
households are put at risk of being burdened with loans that 
they cannot afford, and in some cases are paying more than 
they need to for their home loans. The extreme consequence 
for households in these circumstances is that they may lose 
their homes to foreclosure. 
Many of the alternative mortgage products on the market 
allow borrowers to defer repayment of principal and/or in-
terest for the first several years of the loan term. When the 
payments adjust to include these dues, however, borrowers 
may be faced with payment increases steep enough to be de-
scribed as “payment shocks.” Consider the following case: If 
a borrower were to take out a $180,000, 30-year, 6.4 percent 
loan that requires payment only of interest for the first five 
years, the monthly payment for the first five years would be 
$960. However, this payment would jump to $1,204 at the 
end of the five year period. If interest rates were to go up by 
2 percent over the same time period, the payment would rise 
Box 1.2 Predatory Lending
Unfortunately, the growth of subprime lending has been associated with an increase in what is termed “predatory” lending. 
There is no universally accepted definition of “predatory lending” that marks a bright line between what is predatory and 
what isn’t.  A loan with particular features might be predatory for one borrower but appropriate for another.  Whether or not 
a loan is predatory depends on the characteristics of the borrower, and the extent to which he/she will be able to repay the 
loan and is fully aware of the terms of the loan. It also depends on the characteristics and business practices of the lender.   
Despite not having a universal definition, there are a range of lending practices that raise concerns for regulators and 
consumer advocates: Was the lender transparent in disclosing the terms and fees associated with the loan? Did the lender 
steer the borrower toward a loan that was not in his/her best interest? In general, did the lender try to take advantage 
of borrowers’ lack of financial sophistication, for example, by targeting the elderly, minorities, and households with limited 
English proficiency? Predatory lenders may fit one or more of these characterizations.   
Some of the other practices commonly associated with predatory lending are: structuring loans so that they are not in the 
best interest of the borrower; rapidly “flipping” loans;1 charging exorbitant fees, and using fraudulent or deceptive practices 
to target and lure borrowers.  





























Alternative mortgage products have 
increased dramatically in recent 
years as a share of nonprime 
mortgage originations.
Source: FDIC, LoanPerformance 









to $1,437.9 This is a conservative example—many loans in 
the subprime market have artificially low “teaser rates” with 
amortization schedules that reset at the second year of the 
loan and adjust frequently thereafter for the life of the loan, 
which further complicates management of payments. (See 
article: Calculated Risk: Assessing Nontraditional Mortgage 
Products)
These types of payment shocks are of particular concern 
for low income-borrowers, who are increasingly devoting 
more than half of their income to housing costs; one-in-five 
first-time homebuyers have faced such a burden in recent 
years.10 This trend is related both to rising housing costs 
and a growing tendency for lenders to allow higher debt-to-
income ratios. Rather than limiting housing costs to the tra-
ditional maximum of no more than 30 percent of income, 
lenders are commonly qualifying homebuyers for loans that 
lead to housing costs of 40 to 50 percent of income.11 It is 
easy to imagine that for low-income households living at the 
margins of their budgets, even small increases in monthly 
housing costs can have a significant effect on their ability to 
cover living expenses and keep up with their monthly pay-
ments.12 If one considers the potential for other payment 
shocks, such as unforeseen medical expenses, the risks of de-
fault and foreclosure are even greater. 
The costs of foreclosure are high. Borrowers are most di-
rectly affected by foreclosure, and risk losing not only their 
equity but also incurring additional penalties and fees. Over 
the long-term, the borrower may face higher credit costs in the 
future as a result of a lower credit score. Borrowers may also 
suffer from non-financial costs such as emotional and physi-
cal stress; children in households that are forced to move as a 
result of foreclosure may also experience negative effects.13 
Foreclosed and vacant properties also can affect the sur-
rounding  community  and  negatively  impact  local  home-
owners and businesses. In a study of foreclosures in Chicago 
in 1997 and 1998, researchers estimated that the cumulative 
effect of 3,750 foreclosures in those years was that nearby 
property values were reduced by a total of more than $598 
million.14 For municipalities, costs may be imposed through 
an increased need for policing and fire protection, demoli-
tion contracts, and building inspections, and revenue may 
be lost due to diminished property taxes. Researchers study-
ing FHA foreclosures in Minneapolis estimated that the av-
erage foreclosure costs the city $27,000 and costs the neigh-
borhood $10,000.15 
One of the key reasons for heightened concern about 
the expansion of subprime lending is its association with 
increased foreclosure risk. Recent data from the Mortgage 
Bankers Association show that as of the second quarter of 
2006, 0.99 percent of all loans were in foreclosure. However, 
while the foreclosure rate for prime loans was 0.41 percent, 
the rate for subprime loans was nearly nine times as high 
at 3.56 percent.16 In addition, a number of researchers have 
found a tendency for subprime lending to be more common 
in low-income and minority neighborhoods than in others.17 
Taken together, these factors point to the potential for con-
centrated  risk  of  foreclosure  in  low-income  and  minority 
neighborhoods. (See Box 1.3: Foreclosure Risk in California)
6   December 2006Foreclosure is, however, only the most extreme endpoint 
for  households  with  unmanageable  mortgage  payments. 
Even if homeowners do not end up losing their homes, 
there is concern that many households are simply paying 
more than they should for their loans. Put another way, the 
problem  of  redlining—the  systematic  denial  of  mortgage 
credit to individuals and groups in low-income and minor-
ity neighborhoods—has shifted; advocates are concerned less 
about access to credit and more about access to credit on fair 
and equal terms. 
Data collected through the Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act (HMDA) have indicated disparities in loan-pricing out-
comes. Enacted in 1975, HMDA has been greatly expanded 
in recent years, both in terms of the institutions that are re-
quired to participate and in the information that they are re-
quired to submit. As of 2004, lenders are required to report 
pricing information for loans that are “high cost” at time of 
origination.18 The 2005 HMDA data show that black and 
Hispanic borrowers are more likely, and Asians borrowers 
less likely, to obtain high-cost loans than are non-Hispanic 
white borrowers.19 These disparities were greater than they 
had been in 2004. While the HMDA data do not include 
many of the factors considered by lenders in underwriting 
and  pricing  loans,  these  figures  have  increased  concerns 
about the fairness of the lending process.
Researchers conducting more in-depth analysis of mort-
gage data have found that a large percentage of subprime 
borrowers are paying more for their home loans than neces-
sary based on the credit risk they present to their lenders, 
and that many of these borrowers are low-income and mi-
nority households.20 One researcher estimated that between 
15 and 35 percent of subprime borrowers could have quali-
fied for a prime rate loan; Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have 
estimated that between 30 and 50 percent did not need to 
use the subprime market.21 
Why would so many borrowers who could qualify for a 
lower rate end up paying more for their mortgage? Research-
ers point to both borrower- and lender-driven factors. Low-
income and minority borrowers may have lower education 
levels and less familiarity with different types of mortgages, 
which can result in either a misunderstanding of loan termi-
nology or susceptibility to steering on the part of lenders. 
Lack of access to prime lenders may be another factor—if 
there are fewer prime lenders in a low-income or minority 
neighborhood, borrowers may not be able to “shop around” 
or may see higher-cost loans as their only option. There is 
also some concern that lenders may not be adequately in-
forming borrowers of the true cost of the mortgage products 
they are selling, or that higher-priced products are being tar-
geted toward lower-income and minority borrowers.22 
Future directions
Much of the research noted here points to heightened 
risk  for  lower-income  and  minority  households  seeking 
mortgages in the current housing market. However, a grow-
ing array of programs and policies is being directed at help-
ing borrowers make choices that will lead to more sustain-
able  patterns  of  homeownership.  (See  article:  Preventing 
Foreclosure: Initiatives to Sustain Homeownership) In addi-
tion, regulatory guidance has been issued for financial insti-
tutions regarding the use of alternative mortgage products. 
(See article: Nontraditional Mortgage Guidance) However, 
there are a number of issues that still must be resolved in 
order to best help those looking to become homeowners. 
What are the most effective types of programs for educating 
first-time homebuyers? Should homeownership counseling 
also include efforts to dissuade would-be purchasers from 
buying a home if there is some risk of foreclosure? What 
kinds of safety nets could be built to protect households 
from  vulnerability  to  payment  shocks?  How  far  should 
regulations go in restricting the extension of nontraditional 
mortgage products? 
For  many  households,  innovations  in  the  mortgage 
market have served as a catapult for reaching the ranks of 
equity-building homeowners. But it is apparent that there 
are risks generated by these innovations that can push house-
holds to the brink of their budgets and threaten the sustain-
ability of homeownership. Further attention must be paid 
to how low-income and minority borrowers enter and main-
tain homeownership in an effort to ensure that the benefits 
of homeownership to these individuals and the communi-
ties they live in are not unduly compromised. 
Laura Lanzerotti recently received a Master of Public Policy degree 
from the Goldman School of Public Policy at UC Berkeley. She con-
ducted research on high cost lending and foreclosure risk in Califor-
nia as part of her degree program, with sponsorship from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco. She works for a nonprofit organi-
zation providing strategy consulting services to help other nonprofits 
and foundations achieve greater social impact.
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Advocates are concerned less about 
access to credit and more about access to 
credit on fair and equal terms. Box 1.3
(continued on next page)
Foreclosure Risk in California
California provides an interesting opportunity for investigating patterns of high cost lending1, foreclosure risk, and the 
relationship between the two trends for several reasons. Rising prices in the housing market have not stifled Californians’ 
interest in becoming homeowners. Many have entered the housing market by relying on subprime and high cost loans, and 
they are spending significant portions of their income on housing costs.2 With so many people stretching so far to purchase 
a home, one might expect to see high rates of loan delinquency and default. However, in the last decade, the number of 
Notices of Default (an official record that a borrower is in mortgage default) has been at a historic low across the state. 
Within the context of California’s strong housing market, homebuyers who find themselves unable to afford their mortgage 
payments have been able to sell or refinance. As a result, the equity-stripping effects and problematic aspects of high cost 
and predatory lending are masked. However, if the housing market continues to cool, as many have predicted, it is likely 
that many more households will be at risk of losing their greatest asset. 
Since 2004, the number of Notices of Default in California has been rising. While it is too early to say whether this trend 
will continue, it is cause for concern. A relatively small percentage of homeowners who receive notices of default actually 
lose their home to foreclosure. However, in California, where actual foreclosures currently are rare occurrences, Notices 
of Default provide important information about the extent to which homeowners have home loans that they cannot afford.3 
To the extent that there are discernible patterns in terms of which communities are affected, these areas may serve as the 
proverbial canaries in the coalmine, indicating where households may face the most trouble in the event of a slowdown in 
the California housing market. 
The study summarized here (the full report can be accessed at http://www.frbsf.org/community) set out to determine if 
there is a statistically significant relationship between the prevalence of high cost lending and foreclosure risk. Data on 
Notices of Default were analyzed for three California counties – Alameda, Fresno, and Riverside. The three selected coun-
ties are in different regions of the state, differ based on their socio-economic characteristics and housing markets, and 
also rank differently in terms of the levels of foreclosure risk and high cost lending that are present. Although they are not 
presumed to be representative of the state as a whole, the three counties were selected because they exemplify some of 
the diversity of California.
The results of this data analysis indicated that in Alameda, Fresno, and Riverside counties, high cost loans and Notices of 
Default are more concentrated in neighborhoods where there are higher percentages of minority residents, particularly 
those who are Black and Hispanic, and areas where median incomes are lower. Controlling for key socio-economic, demo-
graphic, and housing market characteristics, models that tested the relationship between high cost lending and foreclosure 
risk confirmed that there is a small but significant relationship between the two. In other words, there are larger numbers 
of Notices of Default in areas where there are more high cost loans, even after controlling for factors such as income 
and race. While it is difficult to determine whether the relationship is causal, there is enough information to suggest policy 
intervention could be beneficial and that these issues are worthy of further study. 
Directions of Causality
It is important to note that determining the extent to which there is a causal relationship between sub-
prime lending and foreclosure starts, and, further, the direction of that causality, is quite challenging. 
Lenders argue that subprime borrowers present a higher foreclosure risk, and therefore, higher interest 
rates and fees are a legitimate approach to mitigating lenders’ financial risk. On the other hand, subprime 
borrowers may be at greater risk of foreclosure because they are paying more for their home loans. 
Findings of this research suggest some policy action, such as making pre-purchase counseling available to every California 
consumer before they obtain a high cost loan. 
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This study also points to the need for further research, including learning from the experiences of other states that have 
restricted predatory and high cost lending and continuing to monitor and assess high cost lending and foreclosure risk in 
California. Suggestions for further research include: 
	 Make full use of data that are available through the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).
	 Continue efforts to study the relationship between borrower characteristics, loan terms, and loan performance.
	 Develop non-proprietary datasets on Notices of Default and actual foreclosures in California.
	 Conduct a qualitative study drawing on the expertise of housing counselors to understand why homebuyers 
default on their loans.
While foreclosure rates are still at historic lows in the state, the level of high cost lending and recent increases in the num-
ber of Notices of Default within California signal that these are issues that merit more attention from policymakers and 
researchers than they have been receiving. Increasing the rate of homeownership among low-income and minority house-
holds in the state is a worthy goal, but it should not be achieved at such a high cost. 
Foreclosure Risk and High Cost Loans: Alameda County, CA
Each dot represents one Notice of 
Default (2005)
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